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Corporate Social Responsibility between Self-Regulation and 




the existing rules and standards on corporate social responsibility can best be 
described as a hybrid legal architecture, where various regulatory approaches maintain 
a friendly coexistence. this type of multilevel rule-making is sometimes perceived 
to be complicated and not very effective because it is often said to leave some areas 
of economic activity unregulated and, in any case, unenforced. given this difficulty, 
it becomes evident that the interaction between the different regulatory strategies 
currently in place, ranging from self-regulation to government intervention, has to be 
analyzed in more detail. scholars have often argued that there is a governance gap 
because public international law only provides for certain rights, but no obligations, 
for transnational companies. What scholars sometimes miss, however, is that the law, 
although indirectly, does in fact already regulate corporate behavior with regard to 
human rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption.
In this article, I identify and describe various monitoring, enforcement and trans-
parency mechanisms through which international soft law standards are backed up 
by national public and private law rules. the importance of this is that it will help us 
better understand what the role of the law is in the status quo with regard to corporate 
social responsibility.
Keywords
Corporate social responsibility, regulatory theory, transnational governance, legal 
theory, business and human rights, business and the environment
Introduction
the relationship between corporate social responsibility and the law has changed 
considerably, and even today this relationship is not nearly as stable as it might seem, 
partly because the concept of corporate social responsibility is still in a state of flux. 
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the european Commission, for example, previously defined corporate social respon-
sibility as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns 
in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a vol-
untary basis”.1 this definition reflects the earlier understanding that corporate social 
responsibility is supposed to be something of a pure voluntary nature and something 
that actually goes beyond the law, but completely ignores the fact that corporate social 
responsibility can sometimes also be brought through the law or serve as a control 
mechanism for the law.2 this view has been challenged over time, in particular 
because of concerns over the limitations of the business case for corporate social 
responsibility; because of the fact that the law plays an important role in regulating 
corporate social responsibility; and because of the belief that socially and economi-
cally driven reputation and market forces can in turn also enhance the effectiveness 
of the law.3 In order to realign its approach to corporate social responsibility with 
international developments, in part also to address the above critique in legal and 
socio-economic scholarship, the european Commission has considerably broadened 
its definition of corporate social responsibility to “the responsibility of enterprises for 
their impacts on society”.4 this is, of course, very broad and quite diffuse and con-
sequently leaves the concept open to many interpretations. In this article, I look in 
particular at the responsibilities of transnational companies concerning human rights, 
labor, the environment and anti-corruption, as this is basically what the international 
legal and policy framework dictates.
In the status quo, the existing rules and standards on corporate social responsibil-
ity in some sense qualify as a hybrid legal architecture.5 Public international law 
traditionally only obliges nation states to pass certain laws, which in turn apply to 
transnational companies. the nation states in turn have to report their progress under 
these requirements, usually in the form of an action plan. apart from this, there are, 
at least so far, no binding international law norms on issues of corporate social respon-
sibility, which directly apply to transnational companies.6 there are, however, 
1 See the green paper of the Commission of the European Communities on promoting a European 
framework for corporate social responsibility, dated as of 18 July 2001, COM (2001) 336, at 6.
2 Howard R Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (new York: harper, 1953); Keith 
davis, Can Business Afford to Ignore Social Responsibilities? 2 California Management review 70-76 
(1960); Keith davis, The Case for and against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities 16 
Academy of Management Journal 312-322 (1973).
3 Doreen McBarnet, The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond 
Law, Through Law, For Law in doreen McBarnet, aurora Voiculescu & tom Campbell (eds.), The New 
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law, 9-56 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), at 13-31 (beyond law), 31-44 (through law) and 44-54 (for law).
4 See the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
european economic and social Committee and the Committee of the regions on a renewed eU strategy 
2011-14 for corporate social responsibility, dated as of 25 october 2011, CoM (2011) 681, at 6.
5 Rolf H Weber, Corporate Social Responsibility as a Gap-Filling Instrument? in andrew P newell 
(ed.), Corporate Social Responsibility: Challenges, Benefits and Impact on Business Performance, 
87-107 (New York: Nova, 2014), at 90-91 (regulatory gaps) and 102-103 (filling the gap).
6 The one exception to this general rule is the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which establishes legally binding standards to 
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various international soft law standards on business and human rights, working con-
ditions and industrial relations, business and the environment as well as anti-corrup-
tion issued by international organizations such as the United nations (Un), the 
organisation for economic Co-operation and development (oeCd) and the Interna-
tional labour organisation (Ilo), which are, by definition, not binding on transna-
tional companies. the most important soft law instruments include the Un guiding 
Principles on Business and human rights (the Un guiding Principles), the oeCd 
guidelines for Multinational enterprises (the oeCd guidelines) and the Ilo tripar-
tite declaration of Principles concerning Multinational enterprises and social Policy 
(the Ilo tripartite declaration). these soft law instruments are today more and more 
backed up by national governments, a fact that raises important questions as to their 
legal nature.
against this backdrop, it is questionable how the role of the law in the current legal 
and regulatory framework on corporate social responsibility can best be described. 
this article aims at developing a better understanding of the interaction between dif-
ferent legal and regulatory approaches towards transnational companies to protect 
human rights, working conditions and the environment and to work against corruption 
in all its forms on the spectrum between self-regulation and government intervention. 
this article focuses not only on corporate social responsibility reporting, the main 
strategy of the european Union in this area, but also includes other procedural 
approaches. from the various forms of quasi- or co-regulation, it makes use of the 
concepts, models and theories of meta-regulation, responsive regulation and reflexive 
regulation. for this analysis, a socio-legal research approach towards the existing 
rules and standards on corporate social responsibility is implemented.7 reference is 
also made to legal and regulatory theory, as applied in the context of transnational 
governance, in order to gain more insights into the structure of the relevant rules and 
standards in this field.8 In doing so, it is argued that the existing hybrid legal archi-
tecture related to corporate social responsibility can best be explained by a transna-
tional governance model, which is based on several reciprocal and interrelated 
monitoring, enforcement and transparency mechanisms.
Monitoring and Meta-Regulation
an approach that is often used to capture developments at the intersection between 
self-regulation and government intervention, in particular where the government 
controls the self-monitoring activities of transnational companies, is the concept of 
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and provides a host 
of related measures that make this effective.
7 On law and society scholarship in general, see for example David N Schiff, Socio-Legal Theory: 
Social Structure and Law 39 Modern law review 287-310 (1976).
8 On the foundations and applications of regulatory theory, see Peter Drahos & Martin Krygier, 
Regulation, Institutions and Networks in Peter drahos (ed.), Regulatory Theory: Foundations and 
Applications, 1-24 (acton: anU Press, 2017).
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meta-regulation. this concept can be defined as “the state’s oversight of self-regula-
tory arrangements” or “regulating the regulator, whether they be public agencies, 
private corporate self-regulators or third-party gatekeepers”.9 By way of meta-regu-
lation, the process of regulation itself, rather than the social and individual action 
behind it, becomes regulated.10 the fundamental idea of meta-regulation is that self-
regulation by the industry becomes regulated in one way or another.11 Meta-regulation 
can in fact entail any form of regulation that regulates any other form of regulation 
such as legal regulation of self-regulation, non-legal methods of regulating internal 
corporate self-regulation or the regulation of national law-making by transnational 
bodies.12 however, this concept has also led to criticism. fC simon is particularly 
skeptical about the concept of meta-regulation and in her new book on the topic argues 
that “meta-regulation may not work as intended, and may actually trigger undesirable 
side effects”.13 she supports her thesis with both a theoretical alternative, based on 
niklas luhmann’s system theory, and practical issues in connection with her profes-
sional experience in the australian retail market for electricity and gas.
In the corporate social responsibility context, the concept of meta-regulation has 
been advanced in particular by Christine Parker.14 Parker argues that meta-regulation 
in the field of corporate social responsibility must be aimed at making transnational 
companies put themselves through a process of corporate social responsibility aimed 
at corporate social responsibility outcomes.15 It is her understanding that the regula-
tory technique needed in this area would not need to be in the form of the traditional, 
hierarchical, legal regulation promulgated by nation states, but might, rather, include 
international networks of governance and laws that authorize, empower, co-opt or 
recognize the regulatory influence of companies themselves, business associations 
and other industry bodies as well as pressure groups (including civil society) to set 
and enforce standards for corporate social responsibility processes and outcomes.16 
9 See Bridget Hutter, Risk, Regulation, and Management in Peter Taylor-Gooby & Jens Zinn (eds.), 
Risk in Social Science, 202-227 (oxford: oxford University Press, 2006), at 215; Christine Parker, The 
Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy, 15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). see also Cary Coglianese & evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation in 
robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin lodge (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, 146-168 
(oxford: oxford University Press, 2010).
10 Bronwen Morgan, The Economisation of Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial 
Legality 12 social & legal studies 489-523 (2003), at 490.
11 John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control 80 
Michigan law review 1466-1507 (1982); Peter grabosky, Meta-Regulation in Peter drahos (ed.), 
Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications, 149-161 (acton: anU Press, 2017), at 149.
12 Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility 
in doreen McBarnet, aurora Voiculescu & tom Campbell (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law, 207-237 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
at 211.
13 FC Simon, Meta-Regulation in Practice: Beyond Normative Views of Morality and Rationality, 
4 (london: routledge, 2017).
14 Parker (fn. 9); Parker (fn. 12).
15 Parker (fn. 12), at 207.
16 Parker (fn. 12), at 208-209.
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at the same time, other commentators such as olufemi amao have pointed out that 
this concept may be open to criticism because of its indeterminate nature.17 the main 
critique of such a regulatory approach towards corporate social responsibility is that 
it would give legal backing to self-regulation and thereby undermine the law itself. 
By delegating power to transnational companies, it would create a non-transparent 
governance framework, which might perhaps do very little to improve the achieve-
ment of corporate social responsibility objectives. despite this criticism, I use the 
concept of meta-regulation to explain how the (supra-) national legislator and other 
legislative bodies under current law and practice monitor various public or private 
regulators and vice versa.
an example of legal regulation of self-regulation by public agencies or suprana-
tional bodies is the incorporation of certain international soft law standards into 
(supra-) national legislation. the government could, for example, state explicitly 
which public codes of conduct it acknowledges. In this case, the state would name 
several standards, which are considered to be adequate, and oblige the companies to 
choose from this set (or menu). It is, however, entirely up to the respective company 
to choose the standard it wants to follow. this is somewhat similar to the regulation 
in accounting law, where the legislator provides a choice (i.e., the Ifrs or gaaP 
international accounting standard) and the company selects the respective interna-
tional standard. this approach forms part of section 1502 of the Us dodd-frank Wall 
street reform and Consumer Protection act of 2010 (the dodd-frank act) on conflict 
minerals, which requires some companies to submit a report on the measures taken 
to exercise due diligence regarding the supply chain of conflict minerals.18 the final 
rule of the Us securities and exchange Commission for its implementation, dated 
as of 22 august 2012, specifies the standard for due diligence that must be exercised 
and states that companies must follow an internationally or nationally recognized due 
diligence framework, such as the oeCd due diligence guidance for responsible 
supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-affected and high-risk areas.19 this 
approach is also followed in the dutch Child labour due diligence Proposal (the 
dutch Proposal), which entails a similar due diligence provision. according to the 
dutch Proposal, companies based in the netherlands should act in accordance with 
the Ilo Child labour guidance tool for Business for the purpose of this due dili-
gence review.20 a similar approach was also implemented on the supranational level 
in the context of non-financial reporting: in June 2017, the European Commission 
published non-binding guidelines on the methodology for reporting non-financial 
information, which are supposed to help large companies to disclose the required 
environmental and social information.21 according to these guidelines, the said com-
17 Olufemi Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law: Multinational 
Corporations in Developing Countries, 75 (abingdon: routledge, 2011).
18 See section 1502(b)(p)(1)(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
19 17 CFR parts 240 and 249b, at 31.
20 See article 7(1) of the Dutch Proposal.
21 European Commission, Guidelines on non-financial reporting (methodology for reporting non-
financial information), C/2017/4234, OJ C 215 of 5 July 2017. For further details on the relevant non-
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panies may use certain national, european or international frameworks such as the 
Un global Compact, the Un guiding Principles, the oeCd guidelines, the Ilo 
tripartite declaration, the Iso 26000 norm on social responsibility of the Interna-
tional organization for standardization or the global reporting Initiative to produce 
their statements.22
examples of meta-regulation in the corporate social responsibility context through 
non-legal methods include the voluntary accreditation of codes of good conduct, as 
adopted by corporate self-regulators, by the government or international organizations 
on the one hand or the regulation of labelling practices by third-party gatekeepers on 
the other hand. one approach in this area consists of the approval by the government 
or international organizations of those private codes of conduct that incorporate cer-
tain core elements considered to be important. this is in fact what the Un global 
Compact is doing by setting certain minimum standards in relation to human rights, 
labor, the environment and anti-corruption regarding the content of private codes of 
conduct.23 the fact of being a participant of this voluntary initiative thus serves as 
some sort of accreditation, although the Un global Compact does not provide a seal 
of approval, only a transparency mechanism.24 another approach in this area is the 
regulation of labelling practices of third-party gatekeepers such as fairtrade Interna-
tional or the ecolabel of the european Union.25 the european Parliament has, on 
various occasions, promulgated different kinds of rules and regulations concerning 
this, such as a certification under the eco-management and audit scheme (eMas), 
the organic logo or the ecolabel of the european Union.26
Probably the most prominent example for regulation of national law-making by 
transnational bodies is the process of reporting and monitoring on a country level. 
this process is fairly common with regard to the implementation of european law in 
the member states of the european Union: every year, the european Union monitors 
and reports on the application of the relevant supranational law in all countries that 
financial reporting rules of the European Union, see the third paragraph of the section on transparency 
and reflexive regulation below.
22 European Commission (fn. 21), at 19.
23 See the ten principles of the UN Global Compact, available online at <https://www.
unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
24 For a discussion of the main mechanics of the UN Global Compact, see the fifth paragraph of 
the section on transparency and reflexive regulation below.
25 For more information on these fairtrade and environmental labels, see the websites of Fairtrade 
International (https://www.fairtrade.net) and the ecolabel of the european Union (www.ecolabel.eu).
26 See for example Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 november 2009 on the voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-management 
and audit scheme, OJ L 342 of 22 December 2009 (EMAS); Regulations (EU) No 271/2010 of 24 March 
2010 as regards the organic production logo of the European Union, OJ L 84 of 31 March 2010 (organic 
logo); regulations (eC) no 66/2010 of the european Parliament and the Council of 25 november 2009 
on the EU Ecolabel, OJ L 27 of 30 January 2010 (Ecolabel). See also Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 
of the european Parliament and the Council of 25 october 2011 on the provision of food information 
to consumers, OJ L 304 of 22 November 2011 (food labeling rules).
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are member states of the Union.27 In the context of corporate social responsibility, it 
is interesting to note that similar monitoring mechanisms exist with regard to business 
and human rights and international labor standards. With regard to business and 
human rights, it is fair to say that the Un guiding Principles have a significant influ-
ence on the national legislation agenda because they have received so much support 
at the international level. at the same time, the Un Working group on Business and 
human rights strongly encourages all states to develop, enact and update a national 
action plan on business and human rights as part of the state responsibility to dis-
seminate and implement the Un guiding Principles. for this purpose, and in order 
to facilitate this process, the working group has produced a guidance on national 
action Plans on Business and human rights, which provides certain recommenda-
tions to this end.28 the nation states thus have to report their progress on the imple-
mentation of these standards in the form of a report. Many (about 22) states, 
including switzerland, have already done so.29 others, in particular south american 
states, are still in the progress of implementing these measures, while a few others, 
in particular african states, have just begun this process.30 as regards international 
labor standards, it is further worth noting that these standards are backed by the super-
visory system of the Ilo, which is quite unique at the international level. the Ilo 
regularly examines the application of labor standards in member states and if there 
are any problems in the application of these standards, the Ilo seeks to assist coun-
tries through social dialogue and technical assistance. there are basically two kinds 
of supervisory mechanisms in the Ilo framework: the regular system of supervision, 
which involves periodic reports submitted by member states on the measures they 
have taken to implement the provisions of the ratified Conventions, and special pro-
cedures such as representation and complaint procedures of general application as 
well as a special procedure for complaints regarding freedom of association.31
27 See for example the 2018 Annual Report of the European Commission on monitoring the 
application of Union law, dated as of 4 July 2019, available online at <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/
info/files/report-2018-annual-report-monitoring-application-eu-law.pdf> (last accessed 31 December 
2019).
28 UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National Action Plans on 
Business and Human Rights, available online at <https://www.ohchr.org/documents/Issues/Business/
UnWg_naPguidance.pdf> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
29 See UN, State National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights, available online at <https://
www.ohchr.org/en/issues/business/pages/nationalactionplans.aspx> (last accessed 31 december 2019). 
see also the report of the swiss federal Council on the swiss strategy for the implementation of the 
Un guiding Principles on business and human rights, dated as of 9 december 2016, available online 
at <https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/48579.pdf> (last accessed 31 december 
2019).
30 See UN (fn. 29). See also the study of the European Parliament on the implementation of the 
Un guiding Principles on business and human rights, dated as of 2 february 2017, available online 
at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_STU(2017)578031_
en.pdf> (last accesed 31 december 2019).
31 See ILO, Applying and Promoting International Labour Standards, available online at <https://
www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/lang--en/index.
htm> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
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as all these examples show, it must be acknowledged that today the law already 
plays an important role in the monitoring of several industry self-regulating arrange-
ments and state legislation. Various soft law standards that, taken separately, indeed 
have no legally binding effect on transnational companies, all of the sudden become 
binding and must be followed by these companies. this can either be the case directly, 
by way of incorporation by reference, as in the case of section 1502 of the dodd-frank 
act on conflict minerals or the dutch Proposal on child labor, or indirectly, through 
the implementation of certain international soft law standards in the national legal 
system, as in the case of the Un guiding Principles with regard to business and human 
rights. In this context, it is interesting to note that the oeCd rules on conflict miner-
als and the Ilo labor standards are to a large extent the most concrete sets of rules 
and standards in this area. Monitoring by way of meta-regulation is thus arguably a 
highly effective way how the law currently defines and controls certain corporate 
social responsibility issues of our time.
Enforcement and Responsive Regulation
another approach in regulatory theory, which in particular focuses on enforcement, 
is responsive regulation. this approach suggests that governance should be responsive 
to the regulatory environment and to the conduct of the regulated entity in deciding 
whether a more or less interventionist response will be needed.32 responsive regula-
tion in the tradition of Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite essentially promotes regulation 
through engagement and dialogue, while it is committed to learning and engages and 
empowers other stakeholders, also using the strategy of tripartism.33 In their under-
standing of responsiveness, “public policy can effectively delegate government reg-
ulation of the marketplace to public interest groups […], to unregulated competitors 
of the regulated firms […] and even to the regulated firms themselves”.34 the best-
known strategy of responsive regulation is the enforcement pyramid, which includes 
options for enforcement that escalate towards the top.35 Critics argue, however, that 
responsive regulation is mainly about how to respond in the case of non-compliance 
but says little about designing inspections when goals are unclear or contested.36 
scholars further pointed out that inspectors often lack the required knowledge to 
32 John Braithwaite, Types of Responsiveness in Peter drahos (ed.), Regulatory Theory: Foundations 
and Applications, 117-132 (acton: anU Press, 2017), at 117.
33 Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). On tripartism, see Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, 
Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment 16 law & social Inquiry 435-496 (1991).
34 Ayres & Braithwaite (fn. 33), at 4.
35 See John Braithwaite, The Essence of Responsive Regulation 44 UBC law review 475-520 
(2011). see also suzanne rutz, Practicing Reflexive Regulation, 16 (rotterdam: erasmus University 
rotterdam, 2017).
36 Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation 71 Modern law review 59-94 
(2008), at 60-61.
CorPorate soCIal resPonsIBIlItY [2020] EBLR 293
determine the right stage of the pyramid applying to a given situation.37 several 
theories were set out to build on responsive regulation. smart regulation, developed 
by neil gunningham, Peter grabosky and darren sinclair, considerably broadens the 
scope of responsive regulation by expanding the one-dimensional pyramid focused 
on government action through self-regulation and a variety of actions by commercial 
and non-commercial third parties.38 In the concept of “really responsive regulation”, 
Robert Baldwin and Julia Black broaden the scope from selecting enforcement meth-
ods to enhance compliance to include other regulatory tasks.39 the basic element of 
all these theories is that they enable an interactive learning process through a multi-
stakeholder dialogue, which allows the regulated entity to revise its behavior in light 
of past experience.40
although there are, at least in my perception, many applications of responsive 
regulation in the field of corporate social responsibility, in particular with regard to 
various enforcement mechanisms, it strikes me that the academic literature has so far 
failed to analyze and discuss any of these practical examples in greater detail. there 
are, after all, a few contributions that in some way or another link responsive regula-
tion to corporate social responsibility. Jonathan Kolieb, for example, develops a 
refined concept, the so-called regulatory diamond, which is based on the general 
theory of responsive regulation, and applies this concept to business and human rights, 
conflict minerals and other corporate social responsibility issues.41 Moreover, a 
recent Phd thesis, which focusses on regulatory theory related to corporate social 
responsibility in small and medium-sized enterprises, has devoted one section of the 
theory chapter to responsive regulation, but without drawing further inferences.42 
Besides these contributions, it is not difficult to see that various concepts of responsive 
regulation are today closely integrated into some of the most important international 
soft law standards on corporate social responsibility, in particular with a view to 
enforcement. In the following paragraphs of this section, I analyze and discuss dif-
37 Oren Perez, Responsive Regulation and Second-Order Reflexity: On the Limits of Regulatory 
Intervention 44 UBC law review 743-778 (2011), at 753-754.
38 Neil Gunningham & Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy 
(oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); neil gunningham & darren sinclair, Integrative Regulation: A 
Principle-Based Approach to Environmental Policy 24 law & social Inquiry 853-896 (1999); neil 
gunningham & darren sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental 
Protection 21 law & Policy 49-76 (1999).
39 Baldwin & Black (fn. 36).
40 See Colin Scott, Reflexive Governance, Meta-Regulation and Corporate Social Responsibility: 
The Heineken Effect in nina Boeger, rachel Murray & Charlotte Villiers (eds.), Perspectives on 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 170-185 (Cheltenham: edward elgar, 2008); rutz (fn. 35), at 16-17.
41 Jonathan Kolieb, When to Push, When to Persuade and When to Reward: Strengthening 
Responsive Regulation with the Regulatory Diamond 41 Monash University law review 136-162 
(2015), at 155-158.
42 Heath Evans, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Tailoring Regulation and Government 
Policy to the Needs of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 124-127 (adelaide: University of adelaide 
law school, 2017).
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ferent enforcement mechanisms contained in the Un guiding Principles, the oeCd 
guidelines and the Ilo tripartite declaration in this regard.
the third pillar of the Un framework on business and human rights is devoted to 
effective access to remedy “through judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
appropriate means”.43 Conceptually, this includes state-based judicial mechanisms, 
state-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms and non-state-based grievance mech-
anisms.44 the liability provisions contained in the swiss popular initiative on respon-
sible business (the responsible Business Initiative) and the respective counter-proposal 
of the swiss house of representatives are examples of how states may enhance the 
effectiveness of judicial mechanisms in the case of business-related human rights 
abuses.45 although these legislative proposals are not yet law, it is highly probable 
that swiss private law will become tighter in this respect, in one form or another. 
similar progress can also be documented with regard to the effectiveness of the swiss 
state-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms in such cases: in its report on the 
swiss strategy for the implementation of the Un guiding Principles, the swiss fed-
eral Council points to the recent successes of dispute resolution support from repre-
sentations abroad and underlines that it will continue to support its diplomatic missions 
in their dispute settlement efforts.46 In addition, it is worth noting that the commen-
tary of the Un guiding Principles in particular makes reference to the theory of smart 
regulation by stating that nation states should also consider “a smart mix of measures 
– national and international, mandatory and voluntary – to foster business respect for 
human rights”.47 this approach is well illustrated by switzerland’s enforcement 
strategy in this regard as briefly outlined in this paragraph.
the oeCd guidelines cover in particular issues such as human rights, employment 
and industrial relations, the environment and anti-corruption, but also other topics 
such as consumer protection, science and technology, competition and taxation. Under 
the oeCd guidelines, since the year 2000 participating states are required to establish 
a national contact point.48 the main role of the national contact points is to further 
the effectiveness of the oeCd guidelines by undertaking promotional activities, 
handling enquiries and contributing to the resolution of issues that arise from the 
43 See foundational principle 25 of the UN Guiding Principles.
44 See operating principles 26 (state-based judicial mechanisms), 27 (state-based non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms) and 28 (non-state-based grievance mechanisms) of the Un guiding Principles.
45 See draft article 101a para. 2(c) of the swiss Constitution; draft article 55 para. 1bis of the swiss 
Code of obligations.
46 See the report of the Swiss Federal Council on the Swiss strategy for the implementation of the 
Un guiding Principles on business and human rights (fn. 29), at 39.
47 See commentary on operational principle 3 of the UN Guiding Principles.
48 See para. 11 of chapter I of the OECD Guidelines and chapter I of the procedural guidance to 
the oeCd guidelines. see also the report of the oeCd on implementing the oeCd guidelines for 
multinational enterprises (the national contact points from 2000 to 2015), dated as of 21 June 2016, 
availabe online at <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/oecd-report-15-years-national-contact-points.pdf> 
(last accessed 31 december 2019).
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alleged non-observance of the oeCd guidelines in specific instances.49 switzerland, 
for example, already established such a national contact point in the year 2000; since 
then it has been operated by the swiss state secretariat for economic affairs.50 the 
swiss national contact point has heard and (successfully) mediated many disputes 
related to corporate social responsibility.51 the oeCd guidelines are therefore a good 
example of how national legislation can support and assist the enforcement of certain 
international standards.
the Ilo tripartite declaration, which is mainly concerned about international 
labor standards, has for a long time not provided any enforcement mechanism at all. 
since the latest revision of the Ilo tripartite declaration in March 2017, this instru-
ment now also provides for tripartite appointed national focal points, which shall 
promote the use of the Ilo tripartite declaration and its principles at the national 
level. the national focal points may in particular wish to organize “dialogue platforms 
for the tripartite constituents and multinational enterprises to discuss opportunities 
and identify challenges presented by operations of multinational enterprises in the 
national context”.52 such dialogues could also encompass dialogues between home 
and host countries.53 tripartism and stakeholder dialogues, which lie at the heart of 
responsive regulation, are thus also an important element of the revised Ilo tripartite 
Declaration. As Portugal and Senegal, followed by Côte d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Norway 
and sierra leone, have already appointed their national focal points, and many more 
countries are expected to join them in their efforts, this is where an element of gov-
ernment intervention and thus national law comes into play.54
all three of these Un, oeCd and Ilo instruments are good examples of how 
national governments help considerably in enforcing the respective international soft 
law standards, be it through judicial or non-judicial mechanisms by state actors. an 
interesting development with regard to corporate civil liability is the current debate 
and (anticipated) upcoming popular vote on the responsible Business Initiative in 
switzerland. at the end of the day, it is a question of a country’s national law and up 
to the sovereignty of the respective nation state to decide, in a democratic process, in 
49 See OECD, National Contact Points, available online at <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps> 
(last accessed 31 december 2019).
50 See the Ordinance on the Organisation of the National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational enterprises and on its advisory Board of 1 May 2013, sr 946.15.
51 See Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, Information on Specific Cases, available online 
at <https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusam 
menarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/nKP/statements_zu_konkreten_faellen.html> (last accessed 31 
december 2019).
52 See operational tool 1(b) of the ILO Tripartite Declaration.
53 See operational tool 1(b) and para. 12 of the ILO Tripartite Declaration.
54 On the progress of the appointment of national focal points, see ILO, Senegal Appoints Four 
National Focal Points and Lays the Foundations of a National Promotion Strategy, available online 
at <https://www.ilo.org/empent/units/multinational-enterprises/WCMs_616830/lang--en/index.htm> 
(last accessed 31 december 2019); Ilo, Promotion at the National Level / Promotion by Tripartite 
Appointed National Focal Points, available online at <https://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/mne-declaration/
WCMs_570379/lang--en/index.htm> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
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which way and to what extent it wants to provide for such a remedy. the provision 
of an effective remedy under the Un guiding Principles, the establishment of national 
contact points under the oeCd guidelines and the promotion of national focal points 
under the Ilo tripartite declaration at least clearly show that nation states are already 
today deeply involved in this process. the methods and models of responsive regula-
tion may thus provide a powerful explanation of how national public and private law 
is enforcing international soft law standards in the area of corporate social responsi-
bility.
Transparency and Reflexive Regulation
Yet another approach between the law and the market is reflexive regulation, which 
goes back to the work of gunther teubner (“reflexive law”).55 the theory of reflexive 
law applies procedures to those procedures that steer and foster self-regulation within 
social institutions.56 an early critic of this school of thought was erhard Blankenburg.57 
Probably the main criticism of the reflexive law theory is that it unduly delegates 
authority and decision making to irresponsible powers, undermines the rule of law 
and democracy and rests on untenable premises.58 this theory has been further criti-
cized for neither establishing formal rules of interaction nor directing substantive 
outcomes.59 similar approaches have also been put forward by Philip selznick 
(“responsive law”) and Jürgen Habermas (“procedural law”).60 all these theories 
focus on procedural norms, which concentrate on the development of regulatory 
mechanisms, which are in turn aimed at achieving intended outcomes.61 similar to 
meta-regulation, under each of these theories, the law avoids the need to directly 
regulate complex social areas, but focuses on controlling the structure and processes 
55 Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law 17 law & society review 
239-286 (1983); gunter teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg 18 law 
& society review 291-301 (1984).
56 Jean L Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm, 4 (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2002).
57 Erhard Blankenburg, The Poverty of Evolutionism: A Critique of Teubner’s Case for “Reflexive 
Law” 18 law & society review 273-290 (1984).
58 Cohen (fn. 56), at 17; Amao (fn. 17), at 77.
59 Richard B Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation 29 Capital University law 
review 21-182 (2001), at 130; Warren a Braunig, Reflexive Law Solutions for Factory Farm Pollution 
80 new York University law review 1505-1548 (2005), at 1525.
60 Philip Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law 6 natural law forum 84-108 (1961); Philip 
selznick, Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (new York: russel sage foundation, 1969); Philippe 
nonet & Philip selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Towards Responsive Law (new York: harper 
and Row, 1978); Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts 
und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1992); Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: MIt Press, 1996).
61 Cohen (fn. 56), at 4.
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of self-regulation. Unlike substantive law and other than meta-regulation, however, 
these theories do not dictate any particular outcome.
several scholars have applied theories based on reflexive regulation to corporate 
social responsibility and transparency. Colin scott and olufemi amao have written 
about reflexive governance and corporate social responsibility more generally.62 
Catherine Barnard, simon deakin and richard hobbs in particular looked at reflex-
ive law and the evolution of labor standards.63 Karin Buhmann has recently argued 
that the danish reporting requirement on corporate social responsibility is based on 
an understanding of reflexive law theory.64 In her article, she argues that the danish 
reporting requirement exemplifies the application of reflexive law as a regulatory 
strategy applied to push company self-regulation in a direction defined by public law 
standards and policy objectives in areas such as human and labor rights, environmen-
tal and climate change mitigation and anti-corruption. similarly, shuangge Wen 
critically examines the mechanics of reflexive law in relation to business disclosure 
under the UK Modern slavery act of 2015 (the Modern slavery act), concluding 
that transparency is a necessary, but not sufficient legal strategy to respect human 
rights and to eliminate slavery practices in global supply chains.65 although the need 
for transparency seems widely acknowledged in the field of corporate social respon-
sibility, Wim Dubbink, Johan Graafland and Luc van Liedekerke have nevertheless 
expressed some reservations with this idea.66 they argue that both a facilitation 
policy and a command and control strategy are defective and introduce an alternative 
government policy, consisting of the development of a self-regulating sub-system in 
the form of informational intermediate organizations. as I will show in the following 
paragraphs, various transparency-related legal strategies can be explained by drawing 
on theories of reflexive regulation.
the idea that corporate social responsibility reporting might qualify as reflexive 
law is not new.67 It was in fact John Elkington who coined the phrase “the triple bot-
62 Scott (fn. 40); Olufemi Amao, Reflexive Law and the CSR Debate – Reflexive Law: Does It 
Have any Relevance to the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Debate? 6 Cork online law review 
55-64 (2007).
63 Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin & Richard Hobbs, Reflexive Law, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Evolution of Labour Standards: The Case of Working Time, esrC Centre for 
Business research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper no 294, avaliable online at <https://www.
cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-papers/wp294.
pdf> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
64 Karin Buhmann, The Danish CSR Reporting Requirement as Reflexive Law: Employing CSR 
as a Modality to Promote Public Policy Objectives through Law 24 european Business law review 
187-216 (2013).
65 Shuangge Wen, The Cogs and Wheels of Reflexive Law – Business Disclosure under the Modern 
Slavery Act 43 Journal of Law and Society 327-359 (2016), at 357-359.
66 Wim Dubbink, Johan Graafland & Luc van Liedekerke, CSR, Transparency and the Role of 
Intermediate Organisations 82 Journal of Business Ethics 391-406 (2008).
67 See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness 
25 Journal of Corporation Law 41-84 (1999); Amao (fn. 62); Buhmann (fn. 64); Wen (fn. 65).
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tom line” as early as 1994.68 the triple bottom line basically refers to the reporting 
of profits, people and the planet to the public and the various stakeholders. there are 
many examples of rules and regulations on corporate social responsibility reporting. 
Denmark and France were certainly the forerunners in this area. Since January 2009, 
danish listed and state-owned public limited companies with assets or liabilities of 
eUr 19.2 million, revenue of eUr 38.5 million and more than 250 employees had 
a legal obligation to report on corporate social responsibility in a separate sustain-
ability report.69 since december 2011, french listed and unlisted companies with 
more than 500 employees and eUr 100 million in revenue also had similar reporting 
obligations within the scope of their annual reports.70 Under these regimes, the respec-
tive companies had to inform the public and its investors about the existence or non-
existence of corporate social responsibility strategies, their implementation and their 
results. a more recent example for this strategy on the supranational level is the 
directive of the european Union on the disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups (the Csr directive), which was 
adopted in 2014 and became effective in 2017.71 Under the Csr directive, large 
public-interest companies with more than 500 employees have to publish reports on 
the policies they implement in relation to environment protection, social responsibil-
ity and treatment of employees, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery 
as well as diversity on company boards. the Csr directive gives companies sig-
nificant flexibility to disclose relevant information in the way they consider most 
useful, while they may rely on certain international guidelines such as the Un global 
Compact, the oeCd guidelines or Iso 26000. other examples of national disclosure 
legislation include the California transparency in supply Chain act of 2010 (the 
supply Chain act), which requires every retail seller and manufacturer doing business 
in California, with worldwide gross receipts that exceed Usd 100 million, to disclose 
their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their supply chains, and 
the already mentioned Modern slavery act, which requires commercial organizations 
to prepare a slavery and human trafficking statement on a yearly basis.72
68 The Economist of 17 November 2009, Triple Bottom Line, available online at <https://www.
economist.com/node/14301663> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
69 See the Grenelle I Act of 3 August 2009 (establishing an action plan on governance issues) and 
the Grenelle II Act of 12 July 2010 (introducing article 224 on socially responsible investment and 
article 225 on corporate social responsibility in the french legislation).
70 Act amending the Danish Financial Statement Act (Accounting for CSR in large businesses) of 
16 december 2008.
71 Directive 2014/95/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain 
large undertakings and groups of 22 october 2014. on the implementation of the Csr directive in 
selected member states, see the report of the swiss Institute of Comparative law on the implementation 
of the Csr directive, entitled Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2014/95/EU (CSR-Richtlinie): Dänemark, 
Deutschland, Belgien, Finnland, Frankreich, Niederlande, Österreich, Schweden, Vereinigtes 
Königreich, dated as of 30 april 2017, available online at <https://www.isdc.ch/media/1378/e-2017-
12-16-173-richtlinie-2014-95-gz.pdf> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
72 See section 1714.43(a)(1) of the Supply Chain Act and section 54(1) of the Modern Slavery Act.
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at the same time, various disclosure-based schemes, which not only involve report-
ing to stakeholders, but also to a regulatory agency or third-party gatekeeper, and 
some sort of centralized information database or public register, are good examples 
of reflexive law in action, namely in the field of environmental law.73 Perhaps the 
best-known example in environment regulation is the Us toxics release Inventory. 
this publicly available database contains information on toxic chemical releases and 
other waste management activities in the United states and aims to reduce emissions, 
as required under section 313 of the Us emergency Planning and Community rights-
to-Know act of 1986 (the emergency Planning act).74 Under the emergency Plan-
ning act, regulated entities are required to submit annual data on the volumes of 
certain toxic chemicals released into the air, water or land or transferred off-site to 
the Us environmental Protection agency, which in turn makes this information pub-
lically accessible through an online database or otherwise.75 another example from 
the european regulatory landscape is the eco-management and audit scheme of the 
european Union. this scheme, in short eMas, is a voluntary environmental manage-
ment system for companies and other organizations to improve, evaluate and report 
their environmental performance on an annual basis.76 one key element of eMas is 
that there is not only the need for an internal environmental audit by the company, 
but also an external verification and validation by an independent environmental 
verifier. In addition, the european Commission hosts a publically accessible online 
database, which lists all registered organizations and sites. What makes this form of 
transparency different from pure reporting on corporate social responsibility, as dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraph, is the actors involved (regulatory agency or third-
party gatekeeper) and the form of disclosure (information database or public register).
and last but not least, it should be mentioned that the Un global Compact, for 
example, does not have either a monitoring or an enforcement mechanism, but oper-
ates entirely on the basis of openness and transparency. all participating companies 
of the Un global Compact are expected to publish a description of the ways in which 
they are supporting the Un global Compact and its ten principles in their annual 
report or a similar corporate report (i.e., the sustainability report).77 the so-called 
communication on progress procedure, which is at the heart of a company’s commit-
ment to the Un global Compact, is a very flexible format, with only three minimum 
requirements: it must contain a statement made by the Ceo expressing continuing 
support of the Un global Compact and renewing its ongoing commitment to the 
73 See Eric W Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law 89 northwestern University law review 1227-
1340 (1995); rónán Kennedy, Rethinking Reflexive Law for the Information Age: Hybrid and Flexible 
Regulation by Disclosure 7 Journal of Energy and Environmental Law 124-139 (2016).
74 Pub L No 99-499, 100 Stat 1728 (codified and amended at 42 USC §§ 11001-11050 [2012]).
75 42 USC § 11022 (2012).
76 For a detailed description of the ten steps of this scheme, see European Commission, How Does It 
Work?, available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/join_emas/how_does_it_work_step0_
en.htm> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
77 See UN, Create and Submit your CoP, available online at <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/
participation/report/cop/create-and-submit> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
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initiative; a description of practical actions the company has taken or plans to take to 
implement the ten principles; and a measurement of outcomes.78 as the staff mem-
bers of the Un global Compact team collaborate with other frameworks, such as the 
global reporting Initiative, this is where the law eventually comes in. this form of 
transparency is different from the other disclosure rules and regulations, as discussed 
in the two preceding paragraphs, as there is only a very light direction by the law, if 
any at all, as the Un global Compact is a non-binding policy initiative and participa-
tion in that initiative is entirely voluntary.
all these examples support the claim that transparency is an important element in 
regulating corporate social responsibility. It must be assumed, however, that a strategy 
based on transparency mechanisms alone most likely cannot solve the problems that 
might arise out of irresponsible and socially harmful business practices of transna-
tional companies. transparency is in my view nevertheless an important element in 
any policy solution mix. the previous paragraphs illustrate that transparency often 
comes in different forms and varying degrees of intensity: from a pure reporting 
requirement to a qualified disclosure-based regime with some state involvement or a 
light transparency mechanism with no or almost no link to the law. In imposing or 
suggesting certain disclosure measures on various corporate social responsibility 
issues, the law, in an indirect and reflexive way, regulates corporate behavior in rela-
tion to these issues. reflexive regulation, in the tradition of reflexive law theory or 
other related schools of thought, provides thus a very useful theoretical concept of 
how legal strategies based on transparency operate in this context.
Conclusion
the purpose of this article has been to show some of the interactions between corpo-
rate social responsibility and the law. While it might sometimes be perceived that 
there is some sort of governance gap between what public international law demands 
and what the national law prescribes, this article is a simple attempt to show that this 
perception does in reality not, at least no longer, hold true. It has been shown that 
today there is in fact a clear trend towards a convergence of these two, in principle, 
very different bodies of the law and that there is a lot of interaction taking place 
between international soft law standards and national public and private law rules. 
Pursuant to the discussions and illustrations in the preceding sections, this is probably 
most evident with regard to the enforcement of the Un guiding Principles, the oeCd 
guidelines and the Ilo tripartite declaration. from an efficiency point of view, it 
might even be the case that many of the described non-judicial enforcement mecha-
nisms are in practice actually much more effective than the enforcement of hard 
liability rules before state courts, although this mechanism certainly has its justifica-
tions. the same logic of course applies to the monitoring and transparency dimensions 
78 See UN, The Communication on Progress (CoP) in Brief, available online at <https://www.
unglobalcompact.org/participation/report/cop> (last accessed 31 december 2019).
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of the argument, mainly because various new legal acts and regulations have been 
adopted over the past few years that strengthen the international legal and policy 
framework in this regard.
from a transnational governance perspective, the existing hybrid legal architecture 
on corporate social responsibility, in which many legal and policy instruments are 
connected to each other and eventually overlap, can in my view best be described as 
a complex interaction between various monitoring, enforcement and transparency 
mechanisms. from a monitoring perspective, the various examples discussed in this 
article attest how the law – often in very subtle, indirect ways – regulates industry 
self-regulation, thereby essentially turning non-binding soft law standards into bind-
ing legal rules. as there are currently many different dialogue platforms in place, such 
as the national contact points according to the oeCd guidelines or the national focal 
points pursuant to the Ilo tripartite declaration, the involvement of various stake-
holders in the enforcement process is nowadays also much facilitated by the law. on 
top of that, transparency schemes and disclosure rules and regulations, which come 
in several different forms and with a varying degree of intensity, ensure that the rel-
evant market and reputation mechanisms are working as they should. these three 
concentric circles of regulatory instruments are in my view the main mechanisms that 
put the law on corporate social responsibility into action.
at the same time, legal and regulatory theory has certainly provided a rich stock 
of transnational governance tools, which allow for a deeper analysis of this hybrid 
legal architecture. In the concept of meta-regulation, for example, the process of 
regulation itself becomes regulated, mainly by controlling the structures and processes 
of self-regulation, but sometimes also by dictating a particular outcome. Many of the 
models of responsive regulation that have been introduced focus in particular on 
enforcement and enable an interactive learning process through a multi-stakeholder 
dialogue, which allows the regulated entity to revise its behavior in light of past expe-
rience. similarly, all mentioned theories on reflexive regulation essentially focus on 
procedural norms, which concentrate on the development of regulatory mechanisms, 
and in their turn aim at achieving intended outcomes. therefore, some of the core 
elements of the transnational governance structures in the field of corporate social 
responsibility are the presence and activity of more than just a single regulator – the 
regulators basically form a network among themselves and control each other – and 
the insight that we today live in a multilevel regulatory framework, which includes 
binding instruments on the international, supranational and national level as well as 
non-binding instruments by international organizations, industries and pressure 
groups and transnational companies themselves.
the main thesis put forward in this article is that national public and private law 
already today regulates many issues of corporate social responsibility, although not 
in the identical tone and mode as public international law, which is embodied in 
various international soft law standards. It has been shown that we do not live in an 
unregulated wasteland in terms of corporate social responsibility, but that the law in 
many ways monitors and enforces the industry self-regulating initiatives that are cur-
rently in place and makes the underlying issues more transparent. In this understand-
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ing, the law basically supports and reinforces international soft law standards by way 
of a transnational governance framework, which is at the core based on a certain set 
of monitoring, enforcement and transparency mechanisms. We must hope that this 
path, which seems to be very promising in the field of corporate social responsibility, 
will be further developed and refined in any upcoming law and regulatory reform in 
this area.
